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DUE PROCESS AND THE AMERICAN VETERAN: WHAT THE 
CONSTITUTION CAN TELL US ABOUT THE VETERANS‘ 
BENEFITS SYSTEM 
Michael P. Allen* 
INTRODUCTION 
There are currently approximately 23 million American military 
veterans.1  The United States Department of Veterans Affairs (the VA) 
administers a host of benefits Congress has established to provide for 
these veterans and their families.2  In fiscal year 2010 alone, over $41 
billion was spent on benefits for veterans, and their spouses and 
dependants, for injuries or death related to military service.3  These 
service-connected benefits allow for compensation when a current 
disability can be connected with an accident or injury incurred while in 
service.4  Applications for service-connected disability compensation 
account for the great majority of non-medical benefits veterans seek.5 
All of this activity and the resources associated with it are, in some 
sense, our collective contemporary response to President Abraham 
Lincoln‘s famous call to honor those who served our country, including 
those who make the ultimate sacrifice.6  Suffice to say, the system for 
 
 * Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Strategic Initiatives, and 
Director, Veterans Law Institute, Stetson University College of Law; B.A., 1989 University of 
Rochester; J.D., 1992 Columbia University School of Law.  Portions of this Article were presented at 
the Eleventh Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the 
related conference of that court‘s bar association.  I thank the participants at those events for their 
comments and suggestions. 
 1. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010, at E1 
(2011) [hereinafter ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT 2010], available at 
http://www.vba.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/2010_abr.pdf.  In this Article, I will generally use the term 
―veteran‖ to refer to the person seeking benefits from the VA.  See 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006) (defining 
―veteran‖ for purposes of receipt of veterans‘ benefits).  However, the class of persons eligible to 
receive benefits from the government based on military service is broader, including certain family 
members.  See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL ch. 7 (Barton F. Stichman & Ronald B. Abrams eds., 
2010) (providing an overview of various benefits available to spouses and children of veterans). 
 2. See, e.g., Benefits Fact Sheets, DEP‘T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (July 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.vba.va.gov/VBA/benefits/factsheets/index.asp.  
 3. See ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT 2010, supra note 1, at 6. 
 4. 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006).  The classic entitlement to service-connected disability benefits 
requires that the veteran establish (1) a current disability; (2) medical or competent lay evidence of in-
service occurrence or aggravation of the disability; and (3) medical evidence of a ―nexus‖ between the 
in-service event and the current disability.  See, e.g., Hickson v. West, 12 Vet. App. 247, 253 (1999); 
Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 506 (1995). 
 5. See James D. Ridgeway, Why So Many Remands?: A Comparative Analysis of Appellate 
Review by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 113, 148–49 
(2009) (noting that approximately 80% of filed claims concern service-connection matters). 
 6. See President ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Second Inaugural Address, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: 
1
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the award of veterans‘ benefits is both culturally important and a 
significant financial obligation of the federal government. 
Until 1988, the VA operated in what has been termed ―splendid 
isolation.‖7  During this period, the VA‘s decisions concerning veterans‘ 
entitlement to benefits were not reviewable by any court.8  This state of 
affairs changed dramatically with the enactment of the Veterans‘ 
Judicial Review Act of 1988 (the VJRA).9  The VJRA created an Article 
I court, today known as the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims (the CAVC),10 to review claims by veterans dissatisfied with a 
VA benefits determination, and to provide for further review in the 
Article III judiciary.11  For essentially the first time in the history of the 
United States, courts were involved in the process of assuring that 
America‘s veterans received the benefits to which they were entitled. 
This Article concerns a recent and important development in the area 
of veterans‘ benefits determinations, one that has significant 
implications for both the practical workings of the process as well as for 
how we consider that system at a fundamental level.  The CAVC‘s 
decisions may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit.12  In 2009, the Federal Circuit held in Cushman v. 
Shinseki13 that applicants for veterans‘ benefits have a constitutionally 
protected property interest in their application for benefits.14  
Accordingly, such applicants are entitled to constitutionally prescribed 
procedures in connection with their claims for benefits under the terms 
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.15 
 
SELECTED SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 449 (Vintage Books/The Library of America ed., 1992) (calling on 
Americans ―to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan‖). 
 7. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-963, pt. 1, at 10 
(1988)).  For an excellent discussion of the history of the award and review of veterans‘ benefits in the 
United States, see James D. Ridgeway, The Splendid Isolation Revisited: Lessons from the History of 
Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 135 (2011); see also Ihor Gawdiak, et 
al., Fed. Research Div., Library of Cong., VETERANS BENEFITS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: HISTORICAL 
ANTECEDENTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM (Mar. 1992). 
 8. See 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1988 ed.).  There was a narrow exception for constitutionally based 
claims.  Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-74 (1974). 
 9. Veterans‘ Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687; 102 Stat. 4105 (1988). 
 10. The CAVC was originally named the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Appeals.  
Veterans Judicial Review Act § 4051, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113 (1988).  Its name was changed in 1998.  
Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 105-368 § 511(b), 112 Stat. 3315, 3341 
(1998). 
 11. I describe in detail the court and the system by which benefits are awarded and reviewed 
below.  See infra Part I. 
 12. 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2006). 
 13. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 14. Id. at 1292 (―[W]e find that a veteran alleging a service-connected disability has a due 
process right to fair adjudication of his claim for benefits.‖). 
 15. In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment provides that a person may not ―be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without due process of law.‖  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
2
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Cushman is an immensely important constitutional decision on its 
own.  The Federal Circuit addressed a constitutional question the 
Supreme Court had expressly left unsolved, namely whether mere 
applicants for a government benefit have constitutionally protected 
property interests.16  Much could be written about the appropriate 
answer to that question.  But this Article takes Cushman at its word that 
the law is as it was stated in that decision.  Instead, the Article‘s aim is 
to address the implications of that decision for the system by which 
veterans‘ benefits are awarded and reviewed.  Those implications have 
the potential to be as significant as the nature of the decision itself. 
Part I describes the current structure by which veterans‘ benefits are 
awarded and reviewed.  An understanding of that structure, and how it 
developed, is critical to an appreciation of Cushman‘s impact.  As 
described below, the benefits process begins with frontline VA 
employees resolving claims, then proceeds through an administrative 
review process, culminating in possible judicial review by the CAVC, 
the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court.  The VA process is 
designed to be non-adversarial, while the judicial portion of the system 
is traditional in its adversarial nature.  After describing the relevant 
features of the benefits system, Part II then discusses Cushman and 
decisions of the Federal Circuit and the CAVC applying that case‘s rule. 
Parts III and IV turn to Cushman‘s implications.  Part III discusses 
the ways in which Cushman has the potential to alter the functions of the 
various actors in the process, including the VA adjudicators, the CAVC 
and the Federal Circuit.  Cushman has the potential to affect how each 
level of the process of adjudication and review of benefits 
determinations is conducted.  In addition, Part III considers how 
Cushman could affect both the development of the system‘s procedures, 
as well as how veterans approach their claims. 
Part IV turns to a more conceptual matter.  Specifically, it considers 
 
 16. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1296 (―The Supreme Court has not, however, resolved the specific 
question of whether applicants for benefits, who have not yet been adjudicated as entitled to them, 
possess a property interest in those benefits.‖).  The Supreme Court had left the issue unresolved in its 
1985 decision in Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985).  The 
Federal Circuit‘s decision was, however, in accord with the other circuit courts to have addressed the 
issue, albeit not in the context of veterans‘ benefits.  Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1297–98 (citing cases).  The 
question of an applicant‘s constitutional rights when seeking a benefit is distinct from whether a person 
already receiving a benefit has such a constitutionally-protected property interest.  She does.  See, e.g., 
Walters, 473 U.S. at 320 n.8 (―[T]his Court has held that a person receiving such benefits has a 
‗property‘ interest in their continued receipt.‖); Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1296 (―It is well established that 
disability benefits are a protected property interest and may not be discontinued without due process of 
law.‖); Lamb v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 227, 231 (2008) (―An essential principle of due process is that 
deprivation of a protected interest must ‗be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate 
to the nature of the case.‘‖) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 
(1950)). 
3
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what Cushman and its holding reveal about the fundamental nature of 
the system by which veterans‘ benefits determinations are made.  
Cushman forces one to address the critical question of whether the VA 
administrative system remains truly non-adversarial.  As discussed 
below, that basic question remains a controversial one.  Cushman‘s due 
process holding both reveals the uncertainty in the area as well as 
provides an opportunity to address this critically important matter head-
on.  Part V briefly concludes, and discusses some preliminary thoughts 
for ways to improve the system suggested by reflections on Cushman. 
I. THE CURRENT VETERANS BENEFITS SYSTEM17 
This Part describes the process by which veterans seek benefits from 
the VA and how they challenge VA decisions with which they disagree.  
Subpart A provides a roadmap for what the Supreme Court has termed 
the ―unique administrative scheme‖ existing in the veterans‘ benefits 
context.18  Subpart B focuses on the differing natures of the 
administrative and judicial aspects of the system. 
A. The Nuts and Bolts of the Veterans’ Benefits System 
A veteran wishing to receive a benefit, to which she believes she is 
entitled based on her military service, begins by submitting an 
application with one of the VA‘s regional offices (RO) around the 
country.19  If the veteran is awarded the benefit sought, the process ends.  
But the process can continue to another administrative level in certain 
cases because, as the Supreme Court has recently recognized, ―[t]he VA 
has a two-step process for the adjudication of . . . claims [for service-
connected benefits].‖20 
Should the veteran be dissatisfied with any aspect of the RO‘s 
decision on her claim, she may avail herself of an administrative review 
process.  The veteran begins by filing a ―Notice of Disagreement‖ 
 
 17. I have also described the process in prior writings.  See, e.g, Michael P. Allen, The United 
States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at Twenty: A Proposal for a Legislative Commission to 
Consider its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 365–72 (2009) [hereinafter Allen, Legislative 
Commission]; Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004–2006) and What They 
Reveal about the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 483, 488–96 (2007) [hereinafter Allen, Significant 
Developments: 2004–2006]. 
 18. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (2011). 
 19. See BOARD OF VETERANS‘ APPEALS, HOW DO I APPEAL? 3 (2002) [hereinafter HOW DO I 
APPEAL], available at http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Pamphlets/010202A.pdf; VETERANS BENEFITS 
MANUAL, supra note 1, at 843; see also Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1200. 
 20. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1200. 
4
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss2/7
2011] THE CONSTITUTION AND VETERANS‘ RIGHTS 505 
(NOD) with the RO.21  The NOD triggers the RO‘s obligation to prepare 
a ―Statement of the Case‖ (SOC), setting forth the bases of the decision 
being challenged.22  If the veteran wishes to pursue an appeal after 
receiving the SOC, she files a form with the RO indicating her desire for 
administrative review by the Board of Veterans‘ Appeals (Board).23  
―The Board is a body within the VA that makes the agency‘s final 
decision in cases appealed to it.‖24 
The Board bases its decision ―on the entire record of the proceeding 
and upon consideration of all evidence and material of record and 
applicable law and regulation.‖25  In addition to the material developed 
at the RO, the Board may also conduct personal hearings with the 
veteran, during which new evidence may be introduced in the record.26  
The Board processes an extraordinarily large number of appeals.  For 
example, in fiscal year 2010, the Board received 52,526 cases and issued 
49,127 decisions.27 
Since the enactment of the VJRA in 1988, if a veteran is dissatisfied 
with a final decision of the Board, she may elect to appeal that decision 
to the CAVC, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review such matters.28  
The Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs (the Secretary) 
may not appeal an adverse Board decision.29  Congress created the 
CAVC under its Article I powers as a court entirely independent of the 
VA.30  The court is comprised of nine judges appointed for fifteen-year 
 
 21. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(a) (2006); see also HOW DO I APPEAL, supra note 19, at 4. 
 22. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d); see also HOW DO I APPEAL, supra note 19, at 5.  The veteran also 
has the option to seek review by a ―Decision Review Officer‖ at the RO before seeking a SOC.  38 
C.F.R. § 3.2600 (2010).  This optional process is discussed in the VETERANS BENEFIT MANUAL, supra 
note 1, ch. 12.8 at 924–27.  Pursuing this course is merely a way in which to receive an additional level 
of review at the RO.  It does not affect the right to appeal to the Board of Veterans‘ Appeals. 
 23. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3); see also HOW DO I APPEAL, supra note 19, at 6. 
 24. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1200.  The Board is led by a Chairperson, appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate, and a Vice-Chairperson, designated by the Secretary.  See 38 
U.S.C. § 7101(b)(1) (2006) (describing appointment of the Chairperson); 38 U.S.C. § (b)(4) (2006) 
(describing appointment of the Vice-Chairperson).  There are also approximately 60 Board members, 
also referred to as Veterans Law Judges.  See BOARD OF VETERANS‘ APPEALS, REPORT OF THE 
CHAIRMAN, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 BOARD REPORT], available at 
http://www.bva.va.gov/docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2010AR.pdf.; see also VETERANS BENEFITS 
MANUAL, supra note 1, at 972 n.8.  They are appointed to undefined terms and are subject to 
performance reviews conducted by a panel of other members of Board.  Id.  Board members are 
appointed by the Secretary with the approval of the President.  See 38 U.S.C. § 7101A(a)(1) (2006). 
 25. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (2006). 
 26. See HOW DO I APPEAL, supra note 19, at 8–10. 
 27. 2010 BOARD REPORT, supra note 24, at 24.  This figure is the more conservative one the 
Board reports.  During the same period, there were actually 57,925 appeals perfected at the RO level.  
Id. at 16. 
 28. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2006). 
 29. Id. 
 30. 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (2006); see also Watson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 352, 352 (2010) (―[T]his 
5
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terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.31  The 
CAVC is an appellate body that Congress specifically precluded from 
making factual determinations.32  Congress also provided that the 
CAVC could decide cases in panels of not less than three judges or by a 
single judge acting alone.33  This ability to decide cases by a single 
judge is unique in the federal system and is also subject to debate in the 
realm of veterans law34—a matter that will be discussed later in this 
Article.35  The CAVC processes a large number of cases.  For example, 
in fiscal year 2009 (the last year for which an annual report was 
available when this Article was written), there were 4,725 new cases 
filed at the court with 4,379 decisions rendered.36 
Any aggrieved party may appeal a final CAVC decision to the 
Federal Circuit.37  Review of Federal Circuit decisions is available by 
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States.38  Review in 
the Federal Circuit is limited by statute.  In the absence of a 
constitutional issue, the Federal Circuit may review only legal questions; 
the Federal Circuit is specifically precluded from ruling on a factual 
determination or on the application of law to the facts in a particular 
case in the absence of a constitutional question.39  In fiscal year 2010, 
13% of the Federal Circuit‘s caseload concerned appeals from the 
 
Court is an independent Federal Court.  This Court is not part of the VA, and it is wholly separate from 
the VA and the Board.‖ (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7251)). 
 31. The statute creating the CVAC provides that the court shall have between three and seven 
members serving 15 year terms.  See 38 U.S.C. § 7253(a), (c).  Congress authorized two additional 
judgeships on a temporary basis through January 1, 2013.  38 U.S.C. § 7253(i). 
 32. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c) (2006). 
 33. 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b) (2006). 
 34. For discussions of the use of single judge authority, see Allen, Significant Developments: 
2004–2006, supra note 17, at 515–21; Sarah M. Haley, Note, Single-Judge Adjudication in the Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Devaluation of Stare Decisis, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 535 (2004); 
Ronald L. Smith, The Administration of Single Judge Decisional Authority by the United States Court of 
Appeals for Veterans Claims, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 279 (2004). 
 35. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 36. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS 2000–2009 
[hereinafter CAVC ANNUAL REPORTS], available at 
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Annual_Report_FY_2009_October_1_2008_to_September_3
0_2009.pdf (last visited May 29, 2012). 
 37. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2006).  The Federal Circuit was created by Congress as an Article III 
tribunal in 1982.  See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  Unlike the other federal circuit courts of 
appeals, the Federal Circuit‘s jurisdiction is subject specific not geographic.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 
(2006) (setting forth Federal Circuit‘s appellate jurisdiction).  In the veterans law context, in addition to 
hearing appeals from the CAVC‘s decisions, the Federal Circuit also has exclusive jurisdiction ―to 
review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof‖ 
under Title 38.  See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). 
 38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006) (providing for Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction concerning 
decisions of the courts of appeals). 
 39. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 
6
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CAVC.40 
B. The Natures of the Administrative and Judicial Systems 
As described above, the award and review of veterans‘ benefits 
determinations is a hybrid system.  There is both an administrative 
component at the VA and a judicial component independent of the 
agency.  But there is more of a difference than simply proceeding before 
two different types of governmental actors.  There is a fundamental 
distinction in the nature of the processes that are purportedly utilized in 
the differing portions of the system.  This state of affairs is perhaps 
unsurprising given the grafting of judicial review onto the system for the 
first time in 1988.  This subpart describes the fundamentally different 
natures of the administrative and judicial systems.  Its focus is on the 
way in which these systems, in particular the administrative one, are 
purported to operate.  I return to questions of how the system may 
actually operate later in the Article.41 
As the Supreme Court has recently noted, the veterans‘ benefits 
process is a ―unique administrative scheme.‖42  A defining aspect of this 
unique system is that it is purported to be non-adversarial, pro-claimant, 
and informal.43  This fundamental reality has been recognized by every 
court in the system of review Congress established from the Supreme 
Court,44 to the Federal Circuit,45 to the CAVC.46  Congress also 
 
 40. See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED BY 
CATEGORY: FY 2009-10, available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-
court/statistics/Caseload_by_Category_Appeals_Filed_2010.pdf. 
 41. See infra Part IV. 
 42. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1204 (2011).  
 43. For example, the VA has promulgated regulations describing Board hearings explicitly as 
being nonadversarial.  38 C.F.R. § 20.700(c) (2010) (―Hearings conducted by the Board are ex parte in 
nature and nonadversarial.‖). 
 44. See, e.g., Walters v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 309 (1985) (noting 
that as of 1985, ―[T]he process prescribed by Congress for obtaining disability benefits does not 
contemplate the adversary mode of dispute resolution utilized by courts in this country.‖); Henderson, 
131 S. Ct. at 1205–06 (recognizing that Congress ―place[d] a thumb on the scale on the side of 
veterans‖) (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1707 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting)); id. 
(―When a claim is filed, proceedings before the VA are informal and nonadversarial.‖).  Henderson was, 
in many respects, a reaffirmation of the Court‘s understanding of the nature of the administrative system 
evinced over 25 years before in Walters.  Whether changes in the past quarter century have, in reality, 
changed the nature of the system is a topic to which I return below.  See infra Part IV. 
 45. See, e.g., Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing how the court 
and the Supreme Court ―both have long recognized that the character of the veterans‘ benefits statutes is 
strongly and uniquely pro-claimant‖ and characterizing the process as a ―historically non-adversarial 
system of awarding benefits to veterans‖). 
 46. See, e.g., Trilles v. West, 13 Vet. App. 314, 326 (2000) (characterizing VA system as one 
that is a ―pro-claimant nonadversarial claims adjudication process‖); Littke v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 
90, 91 (1990) (―VA takes pride in operating a system of processing and adjudicating claims for benefits 
7
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indicated that it believed the system was non-adversarial when it created 
the current process for judicial review.47  There is no question that there 
have been debates about the utility of a non-adversarial system as well 
as whether such a characterization is accurate as a descriptive matter.48  
For present purposes, however, I focus on the aspects of the 
administrative system that are often cited as evidence of its non-
adversarial, pro-claimant nature.49 
The following aspects of the veterans‘ benefits system demonstrate 
the facially non-adversarial and pro-claimant nature of the process: 
 The VA is required to provide notice to claimants concerning 
what must be done to establish entitlement to benefits.  Such 
notice includes ―any information, and any medical or lay 
evidence, not previously provided to the Secretary that is 
necessary to substantiate the claim.‖
50
 
 Significantly, the VA has a statutory duty to assist claimants in 
developing evidence to establish their claims.
51
  The Supreme 
Court specifically noted this requirement in contrasting the 
administrative system from a traditional adversarial process.
52
 
 There is no statute of limitations to file an application seeking 
benefits based on a service-connected disability.
53
 
 Principles of res judicata have far less purchase in the 
administrative system than they do in general civil litigation 
because veterans seeking to revisit rejected claims have the 
 
that is both informal and nonadversarial.‖). 
 47. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 100-963, at 12 (1988) (―Congress has designed and fully intends to 
maintain a beneficial non-adversarial system of veterans benefits.  This is particularly true of service-
connected disability compensation where the element of cause and effect has been totally by-passed in 
favor of a simple temporal relationship between incurrence of the disability and the period of active 
duty.‖). 
 48. See, e.g., Allen, Significant Developments: 2004–2006, supra note 17, at 526 n.244 
(collecting sources); see also infra Part IV (discussing issues Cushman raises concerning the nature of 
the administrative system). 
 49. The Supreme Court recently noted many of these features.  Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 
1197, 1200–01, 1205–06 (2011).; see also Rory R. Riley, The Importance of Preserving the Pro-
Claimant Policy Underlying the Veterans’ Benefits Scheme: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Administrative Structure of the Department of Veterans Affairs Disability Benefits System, 2 VETERANS 
L. REV. 77, 83–92 (2010) [hereinafter Riley, Pro-Claimant] (cataloguing non-adversarial, pro-claimant 
features of the veterans‘ benefits system). 
 50. 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (2006); see also 38 U.S.C. § 3159(b). (adopting regulations 
implementing the statutory duty to assist). 
 51. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2006). 
 52. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1206; see also Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407 (2009) 
(Souter, J., dissenting) (―The VA differs from virtually every other agency in being itself obligated to 
help the claimant develop his claim . . . .‖). 
 53. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1200–01 (―A veteran faces no time limit for filing a claim . . . .‖); 
Id. at 1206, 1222 (―[A] veteran seeking benefits need not file an initial claim within any fixed period 
after the alleged onset of disability or separation form service.‖).  For a further discussion of issues 
concerning statutes of limitations, see Riley, Pro-Claimant, supra note 49, at 87–89. 
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ability to reopen claims based on the submission of new and 
material evidence
54
 or to attack the earlier decision by alleging 
that it was the product of ―clear and unmistakable error.‖
55
 
 ―[W]henever positive and negative evidence on a material issue 
is roughly equal,‖ the VA is required to give to the veteran the 
―benefit of the doubt‖ with respect to proof of that issue.
56
 




 In terms of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court has 




In addition to the way in which the system is described based on the 
procedures on the books, the non-adversarial nature of the 
administrative aspect of the process is supported by the percentage of 
cases at the CAVC in which veterans proceed pro se.  For example, in 
fiscal year 2009, 68% of appeals filed at the CAVC were from pro se 
litigants.59  And even at the time of disposition, veterans remained pro se 
in 28% of cases.60 
It is not surprising that so many cases the CAVC hears, especially 
when assessed at the time of filing, are pro se.  This is because veterans 
have been in the uniquely pro-claimant, non-adversarial administrative 
system.61  In at least partial recognition of the purported nature of the 
administrative process, lawyers have been disfavored.  During the Civil 
War, Congress imposed a limit of $10 on fees a lawyer could charge for 
assisting a veteran in obtaining most veterans‘ benefits.62  Regarding 
 
 54. 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (2006).  The ability to reopen a claim is not merely hypothetical; it is a 
significant way in which veterans seek benefits.  For example, in fiscal year 2007, the VA received 
838,141 claims for benefits.  Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1070 (N.D. 
Cal. 2008).  612,968 of these filings were claims to re-open previously denied claims.  Id. 
 55. 38 U.S.C. §§ 5109A, 7111 (2006).  To establish clear and unmistakable error in a decision, 
which can be done after the time to appeal has passed, the veteran must show that (1) the decision was 
incorrect because either the facts known at the time were not before the adjudicator or the law then in 
effect was applied incorrectly, and (2) the outcome would have been manifestly different if that error 
had not been made.  Russell v. Principi, 3 Vet. App. 310, 313 (1992) (en banc). 
 56. Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1201 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b)).  The classic CAVC case on the 
benefit of the doubt doctrine is Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49 (1990). 
 57. See e.g., Robinson v. Shinseki, 557 F.3d 1355, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Comer v. 
Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 58. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). 
 59. CAVC ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 36. 
 60. Id. 
 61. There are risks to veterans in the transition from the non-adversarial administrative system to 
the more traditional form of litigation before the CAVC and the Federal Circuit.  I have discussed these 
risks elsewhere.  See Allen, Significant Development: 2004–2006, supra note 17, at 526–28. 
 62. Act of July 4, 1864, §§ 12-13, 13 Stat. 387, 389.  Two years earlier, Congress had limited the 
fees that could lawfully be charged to $5.  Act of July 14, 1862, §§ 6-7, 12 Stat. 566, 568. 
9
Allen: DUE PROCESS AND THE AMERICAN VETERAN: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION CAN T
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012
510 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80 
claims before the VA, this fee limitation remained in place, without 
adjustment for inflation, until 2007.63  But even today, a veteran may 
employ a lawyer for a fee only after she has filed a notice of 
disagreement with respect to an RO decision.64  Such limitations on the 
right of veterans to employ lawyers when seeking benefits are strong 
evidence, if more were needed, that the administrative process is not 
meant to mirror traditional adversary litigation.65 
Unlike the purportedly non-adversarial nature of the administrative 
system, proceedings before the federal courts concerning veterans‘ 
benefits matters are unquestionably traditional and adversarial.66  
Indeed, the CAVC takes the unusual step—at least unusual in other 
contexts—of specifically reminding veterans that they have entered an 
adversarial process.  The CAVC‘s Website provides: ―The Court‘s 
review of an appeal is an adversarial process and pro-veteran rules under 
which the VA decides claims do not apply to the Court.‖67 
In sum, when one considers the nature of the current process for the 
award and review of veterans‘ benefits, one is confronted with an 
amalgam.  The administrative process is descriptively one that is non-
adversarial and pro-claimant.  In contrast, the judicial process is one that 
 
 63. See Pub. L. No. 109-461, § 101, 120 Stat. 3405, 3407-08 (2006).  Fee limitations were not 
imposed on work before judicial bodies when the VJRA first provided for such review.  See Steven K. 
Berenson, Legal Services for Struggling Veterans—Then and Now, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL‘Y 
101, 114 n.63 (2009).  This provision is now codified in the final section of 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) 
(2006) providing that the general fee limitations set forth in that provision ―do[] not apply to fees 
charged, allowed or paid for services provided before a court.‖ 
 64. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1) (Providing that except in certain specific matters related to loans, 
guarantees or insurance, ―[A] fee may not be charged, allowed, or paid for services of agents and 
attorneys with respect to services provided before the date on which a notice of disagreement is filed 
with respect to the case.‖).  Veterans are, however, often assisted by non-lawyer Veterans‘ Service 
Officers (VSOs) associated with veterans‘ advocacy groups such as the Vietnam Veterans of America 
and the American Legion.  For a discussion of the role of VSOs, see VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, 
supra note 1, at 1403–04. 
 65. There has been much written about the appropriate role of lawyers in the system.  For 
background on this issue, see, for example, Michael P. Allen, The Law of Veterans’ Benefits 2008-2010: 
Significant Developments, Trends, and a Glimpse into the Future, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 1, 62–63 (2011) 
[hereinafter Allen, Significant Developments: 2008–2010]; Berenson, supra note 63 at 112–122; 
Victoria L. Collier & Drew Early, Cracks in the Armor: Due Process, Attorney’s Fees, and the 
Department of Veterans Affairs, 18 ELDER L.J. 1, 3–9 (2010); James D. Ridgway, The Veterans’ 
Judicial Review Act Twenty Years Later: Confronting the New Complexities of the Veterans Benefits 
System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 251, 260–63 (2010) [hereinafter Ridgway, Twenty Years]. 
 66. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1201 (2011); see also John J. Farley, III, The New 
Kid on the Block of Veterans Law, 38 FED. B. NEWS & J. 488, 489 (1991) (describing the CAVC as a 
―traditional appellate court‖); Ridgway, Twenty Years, supra note 65, at 257 (―Whereas the VA system 
is non-adversarial and claimant-friendly, the CAVC is an adversarial forum that favors neither side in a 
case.‖). 
 67. See Court Process, U.S. CT. APPEALS VETERANS CLAIMS, 
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/about/how_to_appeal/HowtoAppealWithoutCourtProcess.cfm (last 
visited May 29, 2012).   
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is more traditionally adversarial.  The next Part describes the Federal 
Circuit‘s decision in Cushman.  Thereafter, the Article considers how 
that decision might affect this truly odd system, including how one 
views the administrative process.68 
II. CUSHMAN AND VETERANS‘ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
A. Cushman 
Philip Cushman was a Vietnam veteran who served in the United 
States Marine Corps and was honorably discharged.69  He injured his 
back in service and, after leaving the service, was assigned a disability 
rating of 60% based on his back injury.70  Over time, Mr. Cushman‘s 
back conditions worsened to the point that he could not perform the 
duties associated with his job at a warehouse.71  He eventually sought 
VA benefits and claims to be entitled to a 100% rating based on a 
classification of ―total disability based upon individual unemployability‖ 
or TDIU.72  A veteran claiming TDIU essentially asserts that even 
though his disability standing alone does not merit a 100% rating, his 
condition or combination of conditions is such that he or she is unable to 
be meaningfully employed.73  After a series of remands within the VA, 
the Board denied Mr. Cushman a TDIU 100% rating in the early 
1980s.74  Because there was no judicial review at the time, Mr. 
Cushman‘s case ended. 
Mr. Cushman again sought a 100% rating based on TDIU in 1994 
based on a reassessment of his medical condition.75  The VA granted 
him such benefits effective on the date of his 1994 claim.76  However, 
Mr. Cushman then sought an earlier effective date for his TDIU.77  His 
 
 68. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 69. Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 70. Id.  Once a veteran is service-connected for a disability, the disability must be rated in terms 
of its impact on the veteran‘s earning capacity.  38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2006).  The ratings are in ten percent 
increments from 0% to 100%.  Id.  Congress has directed that the VA adopt a ratings schedule assigning 
a monetary amount for the different levels of ratings.  Id.  For further information on ratings, see 
VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 1, at 261–430. 
 71. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1292. 
 72. Id. at 1293. 
 73. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (2010) (defining conditions for TDIU). 
 74. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1293.  The claim was originally denied in 1980 and was denied again 
on reconsideration in 1982.  Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1293–94.  The concept of effective date concerns the point from which the VA must 
pay a veteran the compensation to which she is entitled.  Congress has provided explicit rules for 
determining the effective date for certain types of claims.  38 U.S.C. § 5110 (2006).  In most 
11
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argument was that he discovered that the medical records that had been 
utilized to deny his claim in the early 1980s had been altered.78  The 
Board eventually denied his request for an earlier effective date and the 
CAVC affirmed that decision.79 
Mr. Cushman next appealed to the Federal Circuit claiming, in part, 
that he was denied due process of law because of the VA adjudicators 
considered these altered medical records.80  The Federal Circuit first 
acknowledged that it was an open question whether an applicant for 
veterans‘ benefits had a property interest subject to constitutional 
protection.81  Whether such a property interest existed was a threshold 
question because the Constitution‘s Due Process Clause applies only if 
there is a ―life, liberty or property‖ interest at stake.82  The circuit court 
answered the question: ―[w]e conclude that such entitlement to benefits 
[for service-connected disabilities] is a property interest protected by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.‖83 
The Federal Circuit reached its conclusion by reasoning that the 
benefits to which veterans are entitled are ―nondiscretionary, [and] 
statutorily mandated.‖84  As such, upon a showing that a veteran meets 
the statutory requirements, she is absolutely entitled to receipt of 
benefits.85  This was enough to convince the court that Congress had 
created the requisite property interest to which the Constitution‘s Due 
 
circumstances, the effective date can be no earlier than the date on which the claim for benefits was 
filed.  38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2006). 
 78. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1294. 
 79. Id.  The procedural history of Mr. Cushman‘s claim is actually more complicated on a 
technical level.  In the veterans‘ benefits system, res judicata principles have less force than in other 
areas of the law.  A veteran may return to an earlier administrative decision and argue that the decision 
should be revisited even though the time to appeal has lapsed.  She can do so either by alleging that she 
possesses ―new and material evidence‖ on the matters decided, 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (2006), or that the 
earlier decision was the product of ―clear and unmistakable error‖ known as CUE.  38 U.S.C. §§ 5109A, 
7111 (2006).  CUE is an extremely complicated area of veterans‘ law practice.  For present purposes, 
however, all that is necessary to know is that after several stops in the system, Mr. Cushman eventually 
properly presented his claims that the Board‘s 1980 decisions denying him TDIU were the product of 
CUE based on the consideration of the altered medical records.  Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1294.  The Board 
rejected those assertions as did the CAVC.  Id. at 1294–95. 
 80. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1296. 
 81. Id.; see also Walters v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8 (1985).  
(noting that the Supreme Court had left unresolved whether applicants for government benefits have a 
property interest under the Due Process Clause). 
 82. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985); see also Cushman, 576 
F.3d at 1296 (―To raise a due process question, the claimant must demonstrate a property interest 
entitled to such protection.‖). 
 83. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1298. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
12
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Process Clause applied.86 
Having concluded that the requisite property interest was implicated, 
the court next addressed what process the veteran was due.  The answer 
to that question was contextual, assessed under the Supreme Court‘s 
familiar test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge.87  In that case, the Court 
instructed courts to consider (1) ―the private interest that will be affected 
by the official action;‖ (2) ―the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedural safeguards;‖ and (3) ―the 
Government‘s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.‖88  In Cushman, the Federal Circuit concluded 
that Mr. Cushman‘s due process rights were violated by the 
consideration of altered documents in the administrative process.89 
Cushman has proved to be a controversial decision on the Federal 
Circuit in the short time it has been on the books.  For example, now-
Chief Judge Rader wrote a concurrence to his own majority opinion in a 
case in which Cushman was applicable, noting colorfully: ―I perceive 
that this court has run before the Supreme Court sounded the starting 
gun on property rights for applicants.‖90  And Judges Bryson and Moore 
 
 86. In a recent law review article, two associate counsels for the Board have taken the position 
that Cushman should be read narrowly such that the Due Process Clause applies only after the veteran 
has demonstrated an entitlement to receive benefits.  See Emily Woodward Deutsch & Robert Jame 
Burriesci, Due Process in the Wake of Cushman v. Shinseki: The Inconsistency of Extending a 
Constitutionally-Protected Property Interest to Applicants for Veterans’ Benefits, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 
220, 249, 251–52 (2011).  Such a reading of Cushman is not tenable.  First, if this reading were correct, 
Cushman would have effectively added nothing to the law.  It was already clear at the time of that 
decision that the due process clause applied once one had established an entitlement to benefits.  
Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1296.  The Federal Circuit noted that it was addressing a question of first 
impression, namely ―whether applicants for benefits, who have not yet been adjudicated as entitled to 
them, possess a property interest in these benefits.‖  Id.  Thus, if the reading of Cushman that Deutsch 
and Burriesci advocate were correct, all the Cushman court did was answer a question that had already 
been resolved.  That seems quite unlikely.  Moreover, the reading of Cushman they advocate is belied 
by post-Cushman decisions I discuss later in this Part.  See, e.g., Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 
1310–11 (2009) (―Although the Supreme Court has declined to address the question whether due 
process protections apply to the proceedings in which the [VA] decided whether veteran-applicants are 
eligible for disability benefits, . . . we have recently held that the Due Process Clause applies to such 
proceedings.‖) (citations omitted).  Finally, the view these authors advance is inconsistent with others 
who have discussed Cushman.  See, e.g., Collier & Early, supra note 65, at 20–22; Miguel F. Eaton, 
Sumon Dantiki, & Paul R. Gugliuzza, Ten Federal Circuit Cases from 2009 that Veterans Benefits 
Attorneys Should Know, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1155, 1172–74 (2010).  At the end of the day, Deutsch and 
Burriesci appear to be arguing for what the law should be as opposed to what the Federal Circuit said 
that it is. 
 87. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 88. Id. at 335. 
 89. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1300. 
 90. Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Radar, J., concurring); see also 
id. at 1357 (―[I]n Cushman, this court stepped beyond the bounds set by the Supreme Court for property 
13
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have engaged in a debate in another case concerning the need for due 
process protection in the veterans‘ benefits system.91  But the Federal 
Circuit has not revisited the issue and Cushman remains the law. 
B. Post-Cushman Developments 
Since Cushman was decided, the Federal Circuit and the CAVC both 
began to cautiously explore the newly articulated application of due 
process principles to the veterans‘ benefits system.  The remainder of 
this subpart briefly canvasses the post-Cushman developments through 
June of 2011.  This subpart begins with the four cases in which the 
Federal Circuit has considered Cushman and then considers the CAVC‘s 
decisions dealing with due process.92 
1. Federal Circuit 
In Gambill v. Shinseki,93 the Federal Circuit addressed whether the 
Due Process Clause requires that a veteran have the opportunity to use 
interrogatories or some other device to challenge written medical 
opinions on which the Board relies when adjudicating an appeal.94  This 
question is particularly important because medical evidence is often 
critical when considering service-connection claims.95  The court, 
however, declined to address the due process issue because the panel 
concluded that any error in Mr. Gambill‘s case was harmless.96  Thus, 
this critically important issue remains unresolved. 
The Federal Circuit next returned to Cushman in Edwards v. 
Shinseki.97  The due process issue in Edwards concerned what the Due 
Process Clause requires of the VA specifically regarding veterans who 
 
rights and due process protections.‖). 
 91. Compare Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 1315-20 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Bryson, J., 
concurring) (expressing skepticism about the need for due process protections), with id. at 1327–29 
(Moore, J., concurring) (generally supporting the application of due process protections).  I discuss the 
views of Judges Bryson and Moore in more detail below when considering Cushman‘s implications.  
See infra Part IV. 
 92. The cases considered in the remainder of this subpart are through the end of June 2011. 
 93. Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 94. Id. at 1311–12. 
 95. This issue is discussed further in Part III.B, infra. 
 96. Gambill, 576 F.3d at 1311–12.  Two panel members concurred expressing competing views 
on the ultimate constitutional question.  Id. at 1313–24 (Bryson, J., concurring) (concluding that due 
process did not require means to confront adverse medical opinions); id. at 1324–30 (Moore, J., 
concurring) (concluding that due process did require such means to confront adverse medical opinions).  
I discuss these concurring opinions in greater detail below.  See infra Part IV. 
 97. Edward v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
14
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claim to suffer from a psychiatric disorder.98  The court indicated that 
Cushman might indeed require certain additional procedural protections 
for such veterans.99  However, the court once again declined to make a 
definitive ruling because it concluded that Mr. Edwards had not 
established that the VA was on sufficient notice of any such condition 
requiring enhanced procedures.100  Again, a significant constitutional 
issue was left in limbo.101 
The other two cases in which the Federal Circuit considered Cushman 
are less important than Edwards and Gambill.  In Guillory v. Shinseki,102 
the Federal Circuit concluded that a veteran who asserted that his rights 
under Cushman had been violated because the VA did not ―properly 
address[]‖ his claims and did not establish a constitutional violation.103  
The court reasoned that ―unlike the situation in Cushman, the statutes 
and regulations provide an adequate remedy for any error that occurred 
in prior proceedings.‖104  In Davis v. Shinseki,105 the veteran argued that 
he, like the veteran in Cushman, suffered a constitutional violation 
because adjudication was based on a falsified document.106  The court 
rejected the claim, however, because unlike in Cushman there was no 
credible evidence that there was in fact a falsification.107 
2. CAVC 
The CAVC has also explored Cushman.  Through June 2011, the 
CAVC has cited Cushman twenty-one times.108  Ten of these citations 
were non-substantive with CAVC ruling in favor of the veteran on other 
grounds and avoiding the constitutional issue, merely citing Cushman 
 
 98. Id. at 1353, 1355. 
 99. Id. at 1355 (―In some circumstances, a mentally disabled applicant, known to be so disabled 
by VA, may receive additional protections while pursuing an application for benefits.‖). 
 100. Id. at 1355–56. 
 101. The issue is significant because of the large number of veterans claiming to suffer from some 
type of mental condition purportedly entitling them to benefits.  For example, in fiscal year 2010 there 
were nearly 800,000 veterans receiving service-connected compensation for ―mental disorders.‖  See 
ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT 2010, supra note 1, at 14.  That was a 9.4% increase from fiscal year 2009.  
Id. 
 102. Guillory v. Shinseki, 603 F.3d 981 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 103. Id. at 987–88. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Davis v. Shinseki, 401 Fed. App‘x 533 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 5, 2010). 
 106. Id. at 534. 
 107. Id. at 535–36. 
 108. This figure was derived by using the ―Shepards‖ function on LEXIS.  In one case, the CAVC 
issued an initial decision that was later superseded by one issued in response to a motion for 
reconsideration.  See Poole v. Shinseki, No. 08-3681, 2011 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1002 (Vet. 
App. May 4, 2011), substituted for Poole v. Shinseki, No. 08-3681, 2011 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 
46 (Vet. App. Jan. 11, 2011).  These cases are counted as one for purposes of this analysis. 
15
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generally for its basic holding, or ruling in Mr. Cushman‘s own case in 
the wake of the Federal Circuit‘s decision.109  In eleven decisions, the 
CAVC wrestled to some degree with Cushman‘s substantive issues.  In 
none of these decisions did the CAVC find a constitutional violation, but 
it did occasionally suggest that under the correct set of facts, there 
would be a serious question concerning due process.  In the balance of 
this subpart, I briefly summarize the CAVC‘s substantive exploration of 
Cushman, which can be generally grouped into four categories. 
The court considered several cases concerning documents used in the 
claims process.  It applied Cushman‘s specific holding dealing with an 
altered document, although it found in both situations in which this issue 
was addressed that the claimed alertation was not material in that 
case.110  The court also faced situations in which veterans claimed the 
VA had lost or destroyed records.  The CAVC held that in both 
situations the veteran had not established the factual predicate for the 
loss or destruction.111  Significantly, however, the court also suggested 
that if the facts were different, there could be a serious constitutional 
question under Cushman.112 
The CAVC also rejected constitutional challenges concerning 
purported VA failures to provide hearings or other matters associated 
with administrative appeals processes.  The court underscored that due 
process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard but concluded in 
 
 109. See Gettler v. Shinseki, No. 09-2257, 2011 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 944 (Vet. App. 
Apr. 29, 2011) (avoiding issue by ruling in favor of veteran on other grounds); Rhone v. Shinseki, No. 
09-2061, 2011 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 436 (Vet. App. Mar. 2, 2011) (same); Cushman v. 
Shinseki, No. 08-3255, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 2171 (Vet. App. Nov. 29, 2010) (applying 
Cushman pursuant to Federal Circuit‘s mandate to a follow on case to Mr. Cushman‘s claims); Hires v. 
Shinseki, No. 10-1347, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1863 (Vet. App. Oct. 13, 2010) (avoiding 
issue by ruling in favor of veteran on other grounds); Chabebe v. Shinseki, No. 09-0114, 2010 U.S. 
App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1484 (Vet. App. Aug. 16, 2010) (same); Newgard v. Shinseki, No. 08-0249, 
2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 844 (Vet. App. Apr. 30, 2010) (same), aff’d in part and appeal 
dismissed in part, No. 08-0249, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2180 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 2, 2011); Presley v. 
Shinseki, No. 08-1717, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 822, at *9 n.3 (Vet. App. Apr. 30, 2010) 
(citing generally to Cushman for proposition that the Constitution requires adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard); Rickett v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 366, 372 (2010) (Kasold, J., dissenting) 
(citing generally to Cushman for point that the Due Process Clause applies to veterans seeking benefits); 
Cushman v. Shinseki, No. 05-3207, 2009 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 2178 (Vet. App. Dec. 15, 2009) 
(deciding on remand from Federal Circuit); Harris v. Shinseki, No. 07-2882, 2009 U.S. App. Vet. 
Claims LEXIS 2023 (Vet. App. Nov. 18, 2009) (avoiding issue by ruling favor of veteran on other 
grounds). 
 110. Easter v. Shinseki, No. 08-4003, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1990, at *3–*5 (Vet. 
App. Oct. 29, 2010); Demps v. Shinseki, No. 08-1945, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 65, at *9–
*11 (Vet. App. Jan. 15, 2010). 
 111. Watson v. Shinseki, No. 08-3816, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 992, at *6 (Vet. App. 
May 28, 2010); Alexce v. Shinseki, No. 06-3559, 2009 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1663, at *2 (Vet. 
App. Sept. 22, 2009). 
 112. Watson, No. 08-3816, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 992, at *6-*7; Alexce, 2009 U.S. 
App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1663, at *2. 
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each case that the veteran had been afforded such an opportunity.113  In a 
related situation, the court also held that the VA had not violated a 
veteran‘s due process rights when it did not specifically inform him of a 
deadline within which he needed to respond to a request for 
information.114  The court concluded that the veteran had constructive 
knowledge of the deadline because it was contained in a specific 
regulation.115 
The CAVC also considered two constitutionally-based challenges to 
the types of evidence the VA considered in the claims adjudication 
process.  In one case, a veteran argued that the VA violated his due 
process rights by basing its decision in part on a medical journal article 
that was not provided to the veteran.116  In the other case, a veteran‘s 
widow claimed that her due process rights were violated when the VA 
interviewed her ex-husband‘s mother without the widow or her counsel 
being present.117  In both cases, the CAVC rejected the constitutional 
argument because of a lack of showing of any harm even assuming there 
was a constitutional violation.118 
Finally, the court dealt with the intersection of the Due Process 
Clause and two important doctrines in veterans‘ benefits law.  First, the 
CAVC discussed Cushman‘s implications concerning the so-called 
implicit denial doctrine.119  That doctrine dictates that a veteran‘s claim 
for benefits will be deemed denied even if the VA does not expressly so 
state when the VA adjudicates any other claim that is sufficiently similar 
to the one deemed denied that a veteran would be on notice of the intent 
of the VA‘s action.120  The doctrine is significant for a number of 
reasons, perhaps most significantly because a finally adjudicated claim 
for which the veteran has not filed an appeal within the allotted time 
may only be attacked by claiming that the earlier decision was the result 
 
 113. Poole v. Shinseki, No. 08-3681, 2011 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1002, at *19–*22 (May 
4, 2011); Easter, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1990 at *3–*6.  In a related vein, the court 
rejected an argument that a veteran had a right to have a particular RO respond to a NOD.  See Mathis v. 
Shinseki, No. 11-1063, 2011 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 864, at *3–*5 (Vet. App. Apr. 25, 2011). 
 114. Boening v. Shinseki, No. 08-0475, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1405, at *8–*11 
(Vet. App. July 30, 2010). 
 115. Id. at *8–*10. 
 116. Ramold v. Shinseki, No. 08-1609 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 735, at *14–*15 (Vet. 
App. Apr. 23, 2010). 
 117. Winsett v. Shinseki, No. 08-0210, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 95, at *22–*25 (Vet. 
App. Jan. 26, 2010), aff’d in part and appeal dismissed in part, No. 08-0210, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
20830 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 8, 2010). 
 118. Ramold, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 735, at *15–*17; Winsett, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. 
Claims LEXIS 95, at *23–*25. 
 119. Cogburn v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 205 (2010). 
 120. See, e.g., Williams v. Peake, 521 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ingram v. Nicholson, 21 
Vet. App. 232, 243–51 (2007). 
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of clear and unmistakable error or by the submission of new and 
material evidence.121  The CVAC held that the implicit denial doctrine 
does not facially violate the Due Process Clause122 and was not applied 
in an unconstitutional manner with respect to the veteran at issue.123 
Second, the CAVC considered the intersection between Cushman and 
the presumption that the VA follows its regular procedures.124  The so-
called ―presumption of regularity‖ is one under which the court will 
presume that ―government officials properly discharge their official 
duties in good faith and in accordance with law and governing 
regulations.‖125  It applies to matters such as establishing a prima facie 
case that a notice was mailed to a veteran concerning a VA action or the 
scheduling of an examination.126  The presumption can be overcome by 
a veteran‘s submission of ―clear evidence‖ that the particular procedure 
was not followed.127 
Although the court described the argument as ―confusing,‖ the 
veteran in Kyhn argued that the CAVC‘s reliance on the presumption of 
regularity regarding the mailing of a notice for a medical examination 
was a violation of due process.128  The court declined to rule whether 
reliance on the presumption raised a constitutional issue because it 
concluded that any such error was harmless.129  Thus, the court again 
left the contours of due process in the veterans‘ benefits system hazy. 
*  * * 
This Part has described the Federal Circuit‘s important holding in 
Cushman as well as the interpretation of that decision in the Federal 
Circuit and the CAVC.  A review of these decisions shows that these 
courts are moving cautiously in their exploration of the contours of the 
due process requirements in the context of veterans‘ benefits 
determinations.  But these decisions also show the potential power of 
that decision with respect to important parts of the system by which 
veterans‘ claims are considered.  The next two Parts consider such 
implications in greater detail. 
 
 121. See VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 1, at 845 (providing overview of ways to 
challenge previously adjudicated denials for which the veteran did not appeal). 
 122. Cogburn, 24 Vet. App. at 213. 
 123. Id. at 213–18. 
 124. Kyhn v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 228 (2011). 
 125. Id. at 232. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 236 n.1. 
 129. Id.  
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III. CUSHMAN‘S STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SYSTEM 
Cushman is a significant decision standing alone in the area of 
constitutional due process.  As discussed in Part II, the Federal Circuit 
has joined the debate in the circuit courts about an open issue of 
American constitutional law, an issue that has the potential to affect 
millions of Americans.  But the decision also has profound implications 
on the structure of the system by which veterans‘ benefits are awarded 
and reviewed.  This Part considers those structure implications.  Part IV 
then turns to what Cushman reveals concerning an underlying tension 
regarding the very nature of that system. 
The next subpart begins with a consideration of what Cushman may 
mean for the various governmental actors in the system.  I then turn to 
Cushman‘s implications for the more general development of the law by 
which veterans‘ benefits are awarded. 
A. Governmental Adjudicators 
1. Impact on the Federal Circuit 
As discussed above, Congress put into place a unique structure of 
judicial review for veterans‘ benefits determinations.130  Congress 
created a specialized Article I court designed to develop expertise in this 
area of law.131  At the same time, Congress recognized the value of 
Article III judicial review by providing for an appeal as a right to the 
Federal Circuit.132  Importantly, however, Congress did not provide for 
plenary review in the Federal Circuit.  Instead, Congress provided that 
only pure questions of law would be subject to Article III review.133  
The only exception to this restriction is for cases presenting a 
―constitutional issue.‖134 
One can certainly debate the wisdom of creating a system with two-
levels of appellate appeal as of right.  Also, one can debate whether 
having done so, it makes sense to limit one layer of such review, as 
Congress did, with the Federal Circuit.135  But the fact of the matter is 
 
 130. See supra Part I. 
 131. The CAVC is only the sixth court of national jurisdiction Congress created in the history of 
the United States.  See History, U.S. CT. APPEALS VETERANS CLAIMS, 
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/about/History.cfm (last visited May 30, 2012).  I have written elsewhere 
about the monumental task the CAVC faced in developing a body of law where none existed as well as 
establishing the CAVC as an institution.  See Allen, Legislative Commission, supra note 17, at 372–75. 
 132. 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (2006). 
 133. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 
 134. Id. 
 135. I have discussed this issue as well as the tension it creates between these courts in other 
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that this is the system Congress elected to design.  The Federal Circuit‘s 
role to review run of the mill disputes concerning factual determinations 
and the application of legal principles to facts is sharply constrained.  
Cushman affects this congressional choice in a significant respect. 
After Cushman every time a veteran makes an assertion that some 
procedure the VA employs (or does not employ) results in a violation of 
due process, the Federal Circuit will no longer be subject to the limits on 
its jurisdiction because there will be a ―constitutional issue‖ 
presented.136  The Federal Circuit‘s role in the process will thereby be 
enhanced because there will be a broader range of matters on which it 
will exercise judgment. 
This point is not trivial.  First, the scope of potential issues implicated 
by due process claims is potentially large and intersects with major 
aspects of the veterans‘ benefits system.  For example, medical evidence 
is often critical in service-connection benefits cases.137  Issues 
concerning the quality of the evidence the VA adjudicators consider as 
well as the procedures in place to allow the veteran to test that evidence 
are central to many cases.138  Those matters can easily be framed around 
the constitutional requirement of due process. 
Indeed, in the short time since Cushman was decided, there have 
already been claims made arguing that the manner by which the medical 
evidence was considered require reversal.139  Because these claims can 
now be couched in constitutional terms, the Federal Circuit will have a 
much broader role in shaping the means by which the VA carries out its 
duties in individual cases.  For example, in Gambill v. Shinseki, a 
veteran claimed he was constitutionally entitled to submit interrogatories 
to doctors providing medial opinions to the Board.140  As discussed 
supra,141 the Federal Circuit avoided answering the question because it 
concluded that even if there was such a right, any error in Mr. Gambill‘s 
case was harmless.142  For present purposes, what is significant about 
Gambill is that the Federal Circuit reached its conclusion concerning the 
harmlessness of any error by considering whether the Board had 
correctly determined that the evidence the veteran submitted was 
 
writings.  See, e.g., Allen, Significant Developments: 2008–2010, supra note 65, at 55–56; Allen, 
Significant Developments: 2004–2006, supra note 17, at 523–26. 
 136. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). 
 137. I discuss the importance of medical evidence in service-connection cases below.  See infra 
notes 185–88 and accompanying text. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 
F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 140. Gambill, 576 F.3d at 1310. 
 141. See supra Part II (discussing Cushman and its progeny including Gambill). 
 142. Gambill, 576 F.3d at 1311–13. 
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insufficient to establish service connection.143  Such an analysis is the 
application of law to fact, something over which the Federal Circuit 
would normally not have jurisdiction.144  It did so in Gambill because of 
the presence of a constitutional issue.145 
All of this is not to say that such a result is normatively undesirable.  
Rather, the point is that Cushman has altered in a significant way the 
appellate balance Congress likely thought it had enacted through the 
VJRA. 
A second point goes to institutional competence.  The CAVC was 
designed to be the primary expert in the area of veterans law.  That body 
has exclusive jurisdiction over all claims by veterans dissatisfied with 
the VA‘s administrative benefits determinations.146  Moreover, those are 
the only claims over which the CAVC has jurisdiction.147  The Supreme 
Court has recognized that the structure of appellate review Congress 
established might often make the CAVC a better court to make certain 
factually-based determinations under the system Congress created.148  
Of course, this statement does not mean that the Federal Circuit does not 
play a role; it does as Congress provides.  This statement further 
suggests that the CAVC sees far more veterans law cases than does the 
Federal Circuit.149  Cushman means that the Federal Circuit is now 
poised to take a more active role in assessing the often fact-bound 
assessments of what process is due under Mathews v. Eldridge.  This 
 
 143. Id. at 1312. 
 144. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2) (2006). 
 145. One could make a similar point concerning Edwards.  In that case, the Federal Circuit 
specifically noted that because the veteran was asserting a constitutional claim the court was able to 
review factual determinations ―to the extent necessary to ensure compliance with due process.‖  
Edwards v. Shinseki, 582 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 146. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2006). 
 147. 38 U.S.C. § 7252. 
 148. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 411 (2009).  The issue in Sanders concerned how to 
determine whether certain VA errors were ―harmless‖ to veterans.  The Supreme Court rejected the 
Federal Circuit‘s rule, noting that ―the Federal Circuit is the wrong court to make such [harmless error] 
determinations.‖  Id.  It continued by commenting that ―[i]t is the Veterans Court [i.e., the CAVC], not 
the Federal Circuit, that sees sufficient case-specific raw material in veterans‘ cases to make 
empiricallybased, nonbinding generalizations . . . ‖ about the types of errors that are likely to be 
harmless.  Id. at 412.  In a more amusing vein, Justice Breyer, the author of the Court‘s opinion in 
Sanders, extended this line of reasoning to the Supreme Court when he said at oral argument in the case: 
―Between me and the Veterans Court, as to who knows best how to work this system , it‘s ten to one it‘s 
not me.‖ Transcript of Oral Argument, Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396 (2009) (No. 07-1209), 2008 
WL 5129089, at *39. 
 149. For example, in fiscal year 2009 the CAVC decided a total of 4379 cases.  See CAVC 
ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 36.  In contrast, in that fiscal year the Federal Circuit decided 173 cases 
originating in the CAVC.  See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, APPEALS FILED, 
TERMINATED AND PENDING DURING THE TWELVE-MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2009, 
available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/b08sep09.pdf (last visited 
May 30, 2012). 
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shift is a significant one in the system Congress implemented. 
2. Impact on the CAVC 
Cushman also has a potential impact on the CAVC.  Clearly, 
Cushman will require the CAVC to address additional issues that were 
not implicated prior to the application of constitutional due process 
principles to the benefits application process.  I discussed some such 
decisions above.150  However, the judges of that court are diligent and 
certainly more than competent to address these matters. 
Cushman will have an additional implication for the CAVC if the 
judges of that court treat the matter in accordance with the formal rules 
of that body.  As mentioned earlier,151 Congress provided that the 
CAVC could hear cases either in panels of at least three judges or by 
single judge adjudication.152  Single-judge adjudication raises significant 
issues because when that procedure is utilized, it results in a decision for 
the court from one judge acting alone.  The benefits of appellate 
decision-making in which one has collegial interchange between judicial 
actors are reduced.153  The CAVC apparently understands this 
consequence of such single-judge adjudication because it limits its use 
to cases in which, in theory at least, the issues at play do not involve the 
breaking of new legal ground.154  Single-judge disposition is not 
appropriate if a case establishes a new rule of law,155 modifies or 
clarifies an existing rule of law,156 or applies an established rule of law 
to a novel factual situation.157  Moreover, the court precludes its single-
judge decisions from being cited as precedent.158 
 
 150. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 151. See supra Part I.A. 
 152. 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b). 
 153. See Allen, Significant Developments: 2004–2006, supra note 17, at 518 n.208 (collecting 
sources concerning the importance of collegial decision-making in the appellate context).  To be sure, 
the CAVC‘s Internal Operating Procedures provide that single judge decisions must be circulated to all 
judges, and those judges do have the authority to request a panel for a case, if those judges choose to do 
so.  See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, INTERNAL OPERATING 
PROCEDURES pt. II(b), at 2, [hereinafter CAVC IOP] available at 
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/court_procedures/InternalOperatingProcedures.cfm.  But one is certainly 
left to wonder whether, given the court‘s caseload, the same type of collegial decision-making takes 
place in such a situation. 
 154. See CAVC IOP, supra note 153, at pt. I(b)(2) (adopting the standard set out in Frankel v. 
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23 (1990) to determine whether a case is appropriate for resolution by a single 
judge). 
 155. Id. at pt. I(b)(2), adopting the standard set forth in Frankel v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 23, 25–
26 (1990) (outlining standard for single judge adjudication). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Rule 30: Citation of Certain Authority, U.S. CT. APPEALS VETERANS CLAIMS (Feb. 3, 
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I have been critical of the extent to which the CAVC utilizes single-
judge opinions, largely because such decisions do not allow the law to 
grow, at least not transparently.159  Of course, the counter-argument is 
that the crushing caseload the court faces requires out of necessity that 
the court use the procedure in a large percentage of its cases.160  If the 
CAVC is to be true to its stated standards for utilizing the single judge 
authority, one would expect that the court will need to hear more cases 
than it otherwise would have done through judicial panels.  After all, 
since Cushman broke new ground, one would expect that a great many 
challenges would either clarify what the flexible due process standard 
requires or, at the very least, apply a newly established legal principle to 
a novel factual circumstance.  This result would mean that Cushman 
would have altered the procedural way in which the CAVC processes its 
caseload.  While the Federal Circuit is certainly a superior court in the 
hierarchy Congress created, this outcome is at least somewhat surprising 
given the independent nature of the CAVC. 
A more disturbing consequence of Cushman may be its effect on 
what the CAVC actually does in terms of complying with its own 
procedures for utilizing the single-judge approach.  Since Cushman 
through June 2011, the CAVC has decided eleven cases in which the 
court engaged in a substantive discussion of constitutional due process 
issues under Cushman.161  In over 80% of those cases, the court decided 
the case using the single-judge procedure.162 
To the extent these CAVC cases concerned claims of altered 
documents, single-judge disposition was clearly appropriate since that 
was the issue in Cushman.163  However, the CAVC‘s single-judge 
 
2012), available at http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/court_procedures/Rule30a.cfm.  Cases decided by 
single judges bear a legend beneath the caption noting that ―[t]his action may not be cited as precedent‖ 
citing to Rule 30(a).  See, e.g., Rhone v. Shinseki, No. 09-2061, 2011 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 436 
(Vet. App. Mar. 2, 2011).  I am unaware of any single-judge memorandum decision in which this 
citation restricted is not included. 
 159. See, e.g., Allen, Significant Developments: 2004–2006, supra note 17, at 515–21. 
 160. See supra Part I (discussing workload of the CAVC). 
 161. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing post-Cushman developments in the CAVC). 
 162. The CAVC decided two cases by panel opinion.  See Kyhn v. Shinseki,  24 Vet. App. 228 
(2011); Cogburn v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 205 (2010).  The CAVC decided nine cases under the single-
judge procedure.  See Poole v. Shinseki, No. 08-3681, 2011 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1002 (Vet. 
App. May 4, 2011); Mathis v. Shinseki, No. 11-1063, 2011 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 864 (Vet. 
App. Apr. 25, 2011); Easter v. Shinseki, No. 08-4003, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1990 (Vet. 
App. Oct. 29, 2010); Boening v. Shinseki, No. 08-0475, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1405 (Vet. 
App. July 30, 2010); Watson v. Shinseki, No. 08-3816, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims 992 (Vet. App. May 
28, 2010); Ramold v. Shinseki, No. 08-1609, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 735 (Vet. App. Ap. 
23, 2010); Winsett v. Shinseki, No. 08-0210, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 95 (Vet. App. Jan. 26, 
2010); Demps v. Shinseki, No. 08-1945, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 65 (Vet. App. Jan. 15, 
2010); Alexce v. Shinseki, No. 06-3559, 2009 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1663 (Vet. App. Sept. 22, 
2009).  I discussed each of these decisions above.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 163. Both Easter and Demps concerned this issue.  See Easter, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims 
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decisions have gone far beyond what could reasonably be described as 
variations on Cushman‘s facts.  For example, in Boening the issue was 
whether the VA had violated a veteran‘s due process rights by failing to 
inform him that if he did not respond to the VA‘s request for 
information within one year the VA would deem his claim 
abandoned.164  In a single-judge memorandum decision, the CAVC held 
that there was no violation of due process because a person is charged 
with knowledge of the law.165  This conclusion may very well be correct 
as a matter of law.166  The point is that the question was new under 
Cushman and, as such, should have been the subject of panel 
consideration under the court‘s rules.  Similarly, in Winsett, the 
claimant—purportedly a veteran‘s widow—argued that her due process 
rights were violated because the VA had conducted an interview of the 
veteran‘s mother without the widow or her representative being 
present.167  The court also rejected this argument for numerous 
reasons.168  Again, however, while the conclusion may be correct, the 
issue presented was not one that fell within the parameters fit for single-
judge adjudication.  
In the end, one of Cushman‘s more significant effects may be 
exposing what some believe is already happening: the CAVC uses 
single-judge adjudication to resolve many more appeals than one would 
expect on the face of the court‘s Internal Operating Procedures.  It is 
possible that the court‘s caseload simply makes it impracticable to 
assign panels to decide all cases.  But if so, Cushman may provide an 
opportunity for the court to more forthrightly describe the cases for 
which it will utilize the single-judge procedure. 
3. Impact on VA Adjudicators 
Cushman will also have an impact on VA adjudicators.  Cushman at 
least implicitly requires that all levels of adjudicators within the VA 
consider the constitutionality of the procedures employed in the process.  
This reality poses, and could lead to, several issues.  First, the frontline 
adjudicators in the ROs are not required to be lawyers, and most are 
not.169  These are diligent men and women who process a great many 
 
LEXIS 1990, at *3–5; Demps, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 65, at *8–9. 
 164. Boening, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 1405, at *7–8. 
 165. Id. at *8–9. 
 166. For example, as the court points out, see id., the Supreme Court has held generally that 
people are assumed to know the law.  See Federal Crop. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384–85 
(1947). 
 167. Winsett, 2010 U.S. App. Vet. Claims LEXIS 95, at *22. 
 168. Id. at *22–25. 
 169. Jeffrey Parker, Two Perspectives on Legal Authority Within the Department of Veterans 
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claims per year.170  But these hardworking civil servants are, quite 
simply, not trained in the intricacies of constitutional law.171  It seems 
unfair to ask them to make these assessments. 
It is also unwise to entrust untrained civil servants with making such 
constitutional decisions, even if they have the authority to do so (which 
is not at all clear).  Systemically, we should not favor developing 
systems based on the judgments of RO adjudicators who are supposedly 
focused on assessing veterans‘ substantive claims for benefits.  This is 
especially the case when these adjudicators—no matter their level of 
commitment to veterans—may not have the basic educational 
background to provide confidence in their abilities.172 
In addition, even if one were only to require these frontline RO 
adjudicators to apply constitutional principles articulated by other 
actors, the prospects for success would not be good.  One commentator 
has noted that RO adjudicators were far less likely to implement judicial 
decisions than were Board members.173  The reality is that Cushman 
poses significant structural challenges at the RO level of the system. 
Moving from the frontline of VA adjudication, the same general types 
of concerns pertain to adjudication at the Board, although they are not as 
pronounced.  Board Members, or veterans law judges, are all lawyers.174  
Thus, in comparison to RO adjudicators, the training concern is not so 
pronounced.  But the concern remains nonetheless.  Board Members are 
experts in the law of veterans‘ benefits.175  They are not, however, 
experts in constitutional law, nor should they be.  Yet Cushman requires 
the Board Members to address constitutional claims as part of their 
duties. 
In addition, there is a potential anomaly introduced into this area as a 
 
Affairs Adjudication, 1 VETERANS L. REV. 208, 216 (2009). 
 170. For example, nearly 350,000 people began to receive either a pension or service-connected 
disability or death compensation during fiscal year 2010 alone.  See ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT 2010, 
supra note 1, at 5. 
 171. Cf. Rory E. Riley, Simplify, Simplify, Simplify—An Analysis of Two Decades of Judicial 
Review in the Veterans’ Benefits Adjudication System, 113 W. VA. L. REV. 67, 87 (2010) [hereinafter 
Riley, Simplify] (―Non-attorney adjudicators at the RO fall under this category of individuals who do not 
have specialized knowledge of the law.  Although RO adjudicators are frequently praised for their ‗vast 
institutional knowledge‘ of the VA system, the fact of the matter is that many do not possess the 
analytical abilities to ‗think like a lawyer.‘‖). 
 172. For example, in addition to not requiring a law degree, a recent study indicated a quarter of 
RO adjudicators do not even have a college degree.  See James D. Ridgway, Lessons the Veterans 
Benefits System Must Learn on Gathering Expert Witness Evidence, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 405, 408 n.24 
(2010) [hereinafter Ridgway, Expert Evidence]. 
 173. Riley, Simplify, supra note 171, at 85–86. 
 174. Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 1002, 112 Stat. 3315, 
3363 (1998) (mandating that all members of the Board be lawyers). 
 175. See, e.g., VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 1, at 972 (―Due to the specialized nature 
of [the Board‘s] work, nearly all Veterans Law Judges are former BVA attorneys.‖). 
25
Allen: DUE PROCESS AND THE AMERICAN VETERAN: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION CAN T
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012
526 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80 
result of the congressional prohibition on appeal from a Board decision 
adverse to the Secretary.176  The Board could potentially make a 
constitutional decision favorable to the veteran that is not appealable to 
any court.177  That state of affairs seems inconsistent with the notion of 
judicial review at the heart of the VJRA.  This form of decision-making 
could also lead to instability in the system.  If the Board were to make 
such a decision, it would be binding on RO adjudication.  Yet in some 
case down the road, the constitutional issue could be a component part 
of a matter in which a veteran is able to appeal.  At that point, the 
judiciary would be in a position to address the issue.  The courts could 
do so in a way that is at odds with the Board‘s earlier position, leading 
to perhaps unnecessary variance in the law. 
B. Impact on the VA Systemically 
In addition to its significant impact on adjudicators, Cushman has a 
significant effect on how the procedures governing the award of 
veterans‘ benefits are developed more systemically.  To understand how 
this is so, first recognize that before Cushman, there were procedures in 
place to assure that veterans seeking benefits had ―fair‖ procedures.178  
Such procedures were not insignificant.179  The reality, however, was 
that in the absence of Cushman, such procedures were the result of 
legislative or administrative grace.  If there were to be additional 
procedures, they would need to come through these processes. 
This is no longer the case.  A decision from the Federal Circuit or the 
CAVC under the rule laid down in Cushman has the ability to create 
procedures as surely as the administrative process.  In fact, the 
procedures dictated under Cushman will be far more powerful because 
they are the result of constitutional interpretation and the judicial 
department‘s duty to ―say what the law is.‖180 
Certain examples underscore this point.  As I will discuss in more 
detail below, one recurrent complaint about the current system is that the 
 
 176. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2006) (providing that the Secretary may not seek review of an 
adverse Board decision). 
 177. One wonders the extent to which the Board would be inclined to make such a decision.  For 
example, as discussed above, two associate general counsels of the Board have taken a position that 
essentially negates Cushman‘s impact.  See supra note 69.  At the very least, the article is suggestive 
that at least some lawyers associated with the Board are unlikely to read Cushman expansively. 
 178. See, e.g., Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 1315–16 (Fed Cir. 2009) (Bryson, J., 
concurring) (discussing statutory and regulatory procedures provided to veterans in connection with the 
claims process); see also Thurber v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 119, 126 (1993) (concluding that statutory 
scheme required that veterans have notice of the evidence the VA uses to address their claims). 
 179. See, e.g., Gambill, 576 F.3d at 1315–16 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 180. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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delays associated with receiving benefits to which veterans are entitled 
are much too extensive.181  Aware of this serious concern, the VA, 
among other actions, adopted a pilot program called the Expedited 
Claims Adjudication Initiative (ECA).182  The ECA was designed to test 
a number of streamlining features at a small number of ROs with the 
goal of determining how to reduce delays in the system.183  I will not 
comment here on the efficacy or wisdom of the ECA.  Nor do I suggest 
that any part of that initiative raises due process concerns.  My point is 
that Cushman is an ever-present backdrop to the ECA as well as any 
other innovations the VA may elect to implement in the system.  All 
such initiatives will be subject to the ultimate touchstone of the Fifth 
Amendment‘s Due Process Clause.  This is not to say that Cushman is 
incorrect.  Rather, it indicates a fundamental shift at some level of the 
responsibilities for crafting the fundamental nature of the veterans‘ 
benefit system. 
One can also see Cushman‘s impact on a more detailed issue that is 
central to many claims for service-connected disability compensation.  
Because of the nature of service-connection claims, issues concerning 
medical evidence and judgments are often critical.184  In other words, 
while there are other ways to do so,185 a veteran will often need to have 
medical evidence demonstrating that there is a connection between an 
in-service injury and a current disability.186  Recognizing the centrality 
of this type of evidence, Congress specifically provided that the VA‘s 
duty to assist encompasses arranging for medical examinations in 
 
 181. See infra Part IV. 
 182. See Board of Veterans‘ Appeals: Expedited Claims Adjudication Initiative—Pilot Program, 
73 Fed. Reg. 20,571–72 (Apr. 16, 2008) (codified at 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1500-10 (2008)). 
 183. For a description of the ECA, see Marcy W. Kreindler & Sarah B. Richmond, Expedited 
Claims Adjudication Initiative (ECA): A Balancing Act Between Efficiency and Protecting Due Process 
Rights of Claimants, 2 VETERANS L. REV. 55 (2010). 
 184. See, e.g., Gambill , 576 F.3d at 1322–23 (Bryson, J., concurring) (―In the [VA‘s] system for 
determining whether particular disabilities are service-connected, the decision frequently turns on a 
medical judgment.‖); VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing the important of 
medical evidence in the context of claims for service-connected disability compensation). 
 185. For example, in some situations a veteran‘s lay testimony can provide the relevant evidence.  
See, e.g., Jandreau v. Nicholson, 492 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (―Lay evidence can be competent 
and sufficient to establish a diagnosis of a condition when (1) a layperson is competent to identify the 
medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay 
testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional.‖) 
(footnote omitted). 
 186. See supra note 4 (describing elements for service-connected disability benefits); Ridgway, 
Expert Evidence, supra note 172, at 407 (noting that in most cases medical evidence is necessary to 
establish the ―nexus‖ between a veteran‘s current disability and an in-service injury).  The CAVC has 
made clear that the Board my not use its own medical judgment.  See, e.g., Coburn v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. 
App. 427, 433 (2006) (―[W]e caution the Board that, although it may reject medical opinions, it may not 
then substitute its own medical judgment for those rejected.‖); Colvin v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 171, 
172 (1991) (holding that Board decisions needed to be based on ―independent medical evidence.‖). 
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service-connection disability claims.187 
The process by which medical opinions are obtained and evaluated 
provides fertile ground for arguments that could be framed under the 
rubric of due process.  I consider only one to make the point about 
Cushman‘s potential systemic implications.  The issue is the one the 
Federal Circuit faced, but did not resolve, in Gambill: what rights does a 
veteran have under the Constitution to ―confront‖ a doctor on whose 
examination the Board or RO relies?188  This question is highly 
significant precisely because medical evidence is often dispositive. 
Before Cushman, the way in which the VA adjudicators considered 
medical evidence, including any rights a veteran had to address that 
evidence, were the creature of statute and regulation.  To be sure, there 
was judicial review of these medically related matters.189  But the 
fundamental reality was that if a veteran received some sort of 
protection or process, it ultimately came through these regulatory 
sources. 
After Cushman, this is no longer the case.  Take the specific question 
that divided Judges Moore and Bryson in their concurrences: should a 
veteran have the ability to use a limited number of interrogatories to 
probe the opinion a doctor rendered.190  If Judge Moore‘s view 
prevailed, it would mean that as a matter of constitutional law, a veteran 
would be entitled to use such interrogatories.  And as a consequence of 
this conclusion, the VA, or the courts, would be forced to take action in 
order to implement the constitutional requirement. 
The questions that follow such a holding are numerous.  How many 
interrogatories would the veteran be able to propound?  What form 
should the interrogatories and the answers thereto take?  What would be 
the scope of such interrogatories or, in other words, what information 
would be fair game?191  Would a doctor be able to object to the 
 
 187. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(d) (2006). 
 188. Gambill, 576 F.3d at 1311. 
 189. Decisions of both the Federal Circuit and the CAVC concerning medical matters are legion.  
See, e.g., Rizzo v. Shinseki, 508 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (concerning lack of requirement for VA to 
provide evidence concerning a doctor‘s credentials unless the veteran raises the issue); Hogan v. Peake, 
544 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (concerning level of confidence to which a medical opinion must rise); 
Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008) (providing guidance concerning means to assess 
the reliability of medical evidence); Kowalski v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 171 (2005) (discussing 
authority of VA to schedule a medical examination even over the veteran‘s objection).  One could 
literally fill pages of this Article with nothing but citations to cases dealing with matters concerning 
medical issues. 
 190. Compare Gambill, 576 F.3d at 1324 (Bryson, J., concurring) (rejecting need for 
interrogatories to test a medical opinion), with id. at 1330 (Moore, J., concurring) (concluding that 
interrogatories were required to satisfy due process).  I discuss these concurring opinions in more detail 
below.  See infra Part IV. 
 191. Perhaps the interrogatories would take the form of those under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, but there is no need that this would be the case.  FED. R. CIV. P. 33. 
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interrogatory?  If not, would the VA adjudicator be able to sua sponte 
strike an interrogatory?  After all, there is purportedly no adversary in 
the VA‘s proceedings.192 
My point is not that these questions are ones incapable of being 
answered.  Nor is it that the questions are ones that would otherwise not 
be on the table.  Rather, the point is two-fold.  First, Cushman means 
that the answers to these questions are now potentially matters of 
constitutional law over which the judiciary has ultimate control.  
Second, the manner in which these issues are addressed may be 
piecemeal.  It is true that the VA could elect to conduct a stem-to-stern 
review of adjudicatory procedures with an eye toward what the Due 
Process Clause requires.  If so, Cushman would still force action but the 
VA could assess each situation systemically.  However, if the VA does 
not take this approach, individual lawyers will raise these issues in 
individual cases.  There may not be a single entity concerned with the 
systemic view, other perhaps than the courts.  But if so, then what 
Cushman effectively does is shift the locus of responsibility for the 
construction of important parts of the system to the third branch of 
government. 
*  * * 
As should be clear from the discussion in this Part, Cushman‘s 
implications for the various actors in the process by which veterans‘ 
benefits are awarded and reviewed are significant.  The next Part 
considers what Cushman might mean for a consideration of the very 
foundation of that system. 
IV. CUSHMAN‘S IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE 
SYSTEM 
Beyond its implications on the adjudicators in the system and the 
related matters discussed in Part III, Cushman is also significant on a 
more fundamental level.  As I described above, on its face the VA 
administrative process is non-adversarial and pro-claimant.193  The 
decision to apply constitutional due process protections in the 
administrative process from the moment a veteran applies for benefits 
underscores a very real question about the true nature of the current 
system.  Specifically, the decision highlights the extent to which the 
administrative process remains, if it ever was, one that is actually pro-
 
 192. See supra Part I.B (discussing non-adversarial nature of the administrative system). 
 193. See supra Part I.B (discussing contrasting descriptions of the natures of the administrative 
and judicial systems involved in the process of the receipt and review of veterans‘ benefits). 
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claimant and non-adversarial.  If one sees the system as truly being pro-
claimant and non-adversarial, Cushman‘s rules seem redundant at best; 
the system will take care of claimants.  If, on the other hand, one 
questions whether the system truly is pro-claimant and non-adversarial, 
implementing due process protections makes more sense.  Considering 
Cushman allows one to step back and assess the system that currently 
serves our nation‘s veterans. 
Correctly identifying the true nature of the administrative process is 
no mere technicality.  A proper identification has real world significance 
for the men and women who agree to defend our collective liberty.  This 
nation‘s recent conflict in Iraq provides just one example.  The great 
majority of troops involved in that conflict were young men and women 
with relatively little formal education.194  As a United States district 
judge noted recently, ―[M]any of these soldiers, once they separate and 
become veterans, may have difficulty navigating complex benefit 
application procedures unless they are provided with substantial 
assistance.‖195  If the system these veterans have to ―navigate‖ is one in 
which the VA is actually acting in their interest in a pro-claimant, non-
adversarial manner, the district judge‘s concern is misplaced.  If, on the 
other hand, the process is non-adversarial in name only, the judge‘s 
concern is one we should all share. 
This concern is not merely a prediction of what could happen.  It is 
descriptive of a divide that already exists in the Federal Circuit.  I have 
discussed earlier Gambill v. Shinseki.196  Recall that in Gambill the 
Federal Circuit declined to decide whether a veteran is entitled to 
propound interrogatories to doctors on whose medical opinion the Board 
relies.197  The court held that even if due process required such 
interrogatories, any error in Mr. Gambill‘s case was harmless.198 
Despite the Federal Circuit‘s panel‘s avoidance of the issue of what 
due process requires in a situation such as Mr. Gambill‘s, two judges on 
that panel wrote concurrences in which they reached starkly different 
conclusions on the substantive constitutional question.  Judge Bryson 
 
 194. These statistics come from the findings of fact entered by the district judge in Veterans for 
Common Sense.  Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2008), 
aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 2012 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9230 (9th Cir. May 7, 2012) (en banc).  Specifically, 82% of Army personnel and 89% of 
Marines had a high school education or less.  Id.  I discuss the Ninth Circuit‘s important decision in 
Veterans for Common Sense in the post-script to this Article. 
 195. Id. at 1070. 
 196. Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir 2009); see supra Parts II–III (discussing 
Gambill both in terms of one of the Federal Circuit‘s decisions applying Cushman, Part II, and as an 
example of the far-reaching implications of the decision in the critical area of medical evidence, Part 
III). 
 197. Gambill, 576 F.3d at 1311. 
 198. Id. at 1311–13. 
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argued that a right to confront a medical opinion through interrogatories 
was not required under the Due Process Clause.199  In contrast, Judge 
Moore concluded due process principles did require opportunity for 
confrontation.200 
Significantly, the debate between Judges Bryson and Moore exposes 
their respective views of the nature of the VA‘s administrative process.  
In concluding that due process does not require the right to confront 
medical testimony on which the Board relies, Judge Bryson placed great 
weight on the non-adversarial and pro-claimant nature of the 
administrative process.201  For example, he noted that ―the use of 
interrogatories would undermine, at least to some extent, the non-
adversarial nature of the veterans‘ compensation system by forcing 
medical personnel into an adversarial posture with regard to veteran 
claimants.‖202  For Judge Bryson because the system is, in fact, non-
adversarial, interrogatories would be fundamentally inconsistent with its 
design.203 
Judge Moore reached a fundamentally different conclusion than 
Judge Bryson, largely because she started at a very different point.  
Judge Moore did not assert that the veterans‘ benefits system is 
adversarial like traditional courts proceedings.204  However, unlike 
Judge Bryson, Judge Moore argued that the system has become more 
adversarial than in the past.205  Importantly, she noted that holding that 
due process requires a means to test medical opinions would not make 
the system adversarial precisely because ―by the time a veteran has the 
need to question a doctor, that doctor has already provided an opinion 
adverse to the veteran‘s interests–the system has already become 
adversarial.‖206  This dispute between Judge Moore and Judge Bryson is 
illustrative of the old adage: where one sits dictates where one stands.  
In other words, their respective conclusions about what the Constitution 
requires flow in large part from their competing understandings of the 
nature of the administrative process.  Cushman merely drove this 
 
 199. Id. at 1324 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 200. Id. at 1330 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 201. See, e.g., id. at 1313–16, 1320–22 (Bryson, J., concurring). 
 202. Id. at 1320. 
 203. Id. at 1320–21 (―I cannot lightly disregard the interest in maintaining the nonadversarial 
nature of the system.  When that interest is balanced against the limited benefits of allowing 
interrogatories, I conclude that the availability of interrogatories is not constitutionally mandated.‖). 
 204. See, e.g., id. at 1324 (noting the system has ―paternalistic attributes‖) (Moore, J., concurring). 
 205. See, e.g., id. at 1328 (―For better or worse, we have noted the increasingly adversarial nature 
of the veterans‘ benefits system . . . .‖ ); see also id. at 1327–28 (discussing how increased presence of 
lawyers in the system has made it more adversarial, a topic to which I return later in this Part). 
 206. Id. at 1326–27; see also id. at 1324 (―I posit that because a veteran only needs interrogatories 
to challenge an opinion that contradicts his claims of entitlement, the process is already adversarial by 
virtue of  the opinion.‖). 
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judicial dispute to the surface.207 
There have long been debates about the true nature of the VA‘s 
benefits system as well as what the ideal system might look like.208  
Indeed, even before the debate between Judges Moore and Bryson, the 
Federal Circuit has itself appeared somewhat schizophrenic about the 
true nature of the system.  On the one hand, one can cite opinions in 
which the Federal Circuit has repeated the mantra that the VA‘s system 
is non-adversarial and pro-claimant.209  On the other hand, the Federal 
Circuit has also discussed how the administrative system has become 
more traditionally adversarial.210  Perhaps it has; nevertheless, Cushman 
comes at a time in which other factors are—or should be—focusing 
decision-makers‘ attention on the critical issue of the true system 
veterans face. 
In the years before Cushman, several developments had either 
highlighted questions concerning the nature of the system or altered the 
system in a way that increases its adversarial nature.  First, certain 
groups of dissatisfied veterans turned away from the VA process and 
 
 207. One could also see this point at play in the Supreme Court‘s decision prior to the VJRA in 
Walters.  The Court there upheld the limitations on fees lawyers could charge in connection with 
veterans‘ benefits matters.  See, e.g., Walters v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334 
(1985).  A significant reason the Court ruled as it did was that it did not see the need for counsel in a 
system that was non-adversarial.  Id. at 333–34 (―This case is further distinguishable from our prior 
decisions because the process here is not designed to operate adversarially.  While counsel may well be 
needed to respond to opposing counsel or other forms of adversary in a trial-type proceeding, where as 
here no such adversary appears, and in addition a claimant or recipient is provided with substitute 
safeguards such as a competent representative, a decision-maker whose duty it is to aid the claimant, and 
significant concessions with respect to the claimant‘s burden of proof, the need for counsel is 
considerably diminished.‖). 
 208. See, e.g., Allen, Significant Developments: 2004–2006, supra note 17, at 526–28; Kenneth 
M. Carpenter, Why Paternalism in Review of the Denial of Veterans Benefits Claims is Detrimental to 
Claimants, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 285 (2004); Richard E. Levy, Of Two Minds: Charitable and 
Social Insurance Models in the Veterans Benefits System, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 303 (2004); Gary 
E. O‘Connor, Rendering to Caesar: A Response to Professor O’Reilly, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 343 (2001); 
James T. O‘Reilly, Burying Caesar: Replacement of the Veterans Appeals Process is Needed to Provide 
Fairness to Claimants, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 223 (2001); Ridgway, Twenty Years, supra note 65, at 251–
53, 295–98; Riley, Pro-Claimant, supra note 49, at 80–92, 114–16.  In fact, these disputes pre-date the 
enactment of the VJRA.  In its 1985 decision in Walters, the Supreme Court noted and ultimately 
rejected the district judge‘s conclusions that the administrative system was in reality more adversarial 
than it appears.  See, e.g., Walters, 473 U.S. at 314 n.6. 
 209. See, e.g., Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that ―This court 
and the Supreme Court both have long recognized that the character of the veterans‘ benefits statutes is 
strongly and uniquely pro-claimant‖ and characterizing the process as a ―historically non-adversarial 
system of awarding benefits to veterans‖). 
 210. See, e.g., Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (commenting that after 
enactment of the VCRA, ―[I]t appears that the system has changed from a nonadversarial, ex parte, 
paternalistic system for adjudicating veterans‘ claims, to one in which veterans . . . must satisfy formal 
legal requirements, often without the benefit of legal counsel, before they are entitled to administrative 
and judicial review.‖) (internal quotes omitted). 
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sought relief from federal district courts.211  These veterans complained 
of systemic faults in the system, including a lack of appropriate 
procedures,212 as well as lengthy delays in having claims resolved,213 
that the veterans claimed demanded judicial intervention.  While these 
veterans were unsuccessful,214 their claims have created pressure on 
those charged with serving veterans to re-evaluate current procedures.215 
At the same time, the VA has engaged in conduct that at least raises 
eyebrows if one assumes that the administrative process is a pro-
claimant non-adversarial one.  For example, in 2007, the VA issued so-
called ―Fast Letter 07-19‖ to its ROs.216  A Fast Letter is a means by 
which changes in procedure are communicated to line adjudicators in 
the system.217  Fast Letter 07-19 provided that for any award an RO 
issued that either involved a lump sum award of $250,000 or more or 
which involved a retroactive award of any amount for a period of eight 
years or more, the RO was to follow a special procedure.218  With 
respect to these so-called ―Extraordinary Awards,‖ the RO was to 
transmit its decision to the director of the Compensation and Pension 
Service for ―final determination.‖219  Significantly, the Fast Letter also 
instructed the RO that it was not to inform the veteran or any 
representative of the veteran that the RO had reached a decision or that 
the director would be involved in the process.220  After becoming aware 
 
 211. See, e.g., Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Veterans for 
Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see also Phillips v. Dep‘t of Veterans 
Affairs, No. 10 C 1698, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25959 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2011) (concerning individual 
veteran challenge). 
 212. See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1086–89 (discussing plaintiffs‘ 
claims concerning defects in VA adjudicatory procedures); Phillips, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25959, at 
*1 (noting that veteran complained of VA failure to provide a hearing on his claims for benefits). 
 213. See, e.g., Viet. Veterans of Am., 599 F.3d at 657 (discussing plaintiffs‘ claims concerning 
unreasonable delays in deciding claims); Veterans for Common Sense, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1083–86 
(discussing plaintiffs‘ claims concerning delays in adjudicating claims); Phillips, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
20959, at *1 (noting that veteran complained of ―40-plus years‖ of delay in adjudication).  Delays in the 
system have also been the subject of academic discussion.  See, e.g., Jacob B. Natwick, Unreasonable 
Delay at the VA: Why Federal District Courts Should Intervene and Remedy Five-Year Delays in 
Veterans’ Mental-Health Benefits Appeals, 95 IOWA L. REV. 723 (2010); Riley, Pro-Claimant, supra 
note 49, at 92–96. 
 214. Viet. Veterans of Am., 599 F.3d at 662 (upholding dismissal of lawsuit based on lack of 
standing); Veterans for Common Sense, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1091–92 (dismissing claims for lack of 
jurisdiction after bench trial); Phillips, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25959, at *1 (dismissing lawsuit for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction). 
 215. See, e.g., Viet. Veterans of Am., 599 F.3d at 657 (discussing congressional action, including 
General Accounting Office reports, concerning delays in VA resolution of claims for benefits). 
 216. See Military Order of the Purple Heart of the USA v. Sec‘y of Veterans Affairs, 580 F.3d 
1293, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 217. See Veterans for Common Sense, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1076 (discussing Fast Letter procedure). 
 218. Military Order of the Purple Heart, 580 F.3d at 1294. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. at 1294–95. 
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of this Fast Letter, several veterans‘ advocacy groups challenged the 
VA‘s actions in the Federal Circuit.221  The Federal Circuit held that the 
rule was invalid.222  One could forgive veterans and their advocates for 
questioning the VA‘s commitment to pro-claimant procedures given the 
way in which it approached Fast Letter 07-19.223 
Congress has also elevated the importance of the issue concerning the 
fundamental nature of the administrative system by increasing the role 
of lawyers in the veterans‘ benefits process.  As lawyers become more 
involved in the system, it will, by definition, become more complex and 
formal.224  Judge Moore in her concurring opinion in Gambill 
specifically noted how the increased presence of lawyers in the system 
pursuant to various congressional actions had reshaped the way in which 
that system operates.225 
In sum, then, tensions between the avowed nature of the 
administrative process and the way that process works on the ground 
have been recognized for some time; and they have been building.  
Cushman brings those tensions into only starker focus.  Given that 
reality, Cushman—whether normatively correct or not—should be 
embraced as an opportunity.  Those involved in the important work on 
behalf of America‘s veterans should seize this opportunity to 
consciously consider how they can best serve those who have borne the 
battle.  In the brief conclusion that follows in Part V, I discuss the 
conscientious consideration that Cushman should prompt. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Two things should be apparent at this point.  First, the system by 
 
 221. Id. at 1294.  The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the lawfulness of 
rules and regulations the VA promulgates.  38 U.S.C. § 7292(c) (2006). 
 222. Military Order of the Purple Heart, 580 F.3d at 1297–98. 
 223. One could also refer in this regard to certain of VA‘s actions in response to CAVC decisions 
favorable to veterans.  For example, the CAVC held the VA Secretary in contempt for failing to comply 
with the court‘s mandate to expeditiously address a remanded claim.  Harvey v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 
284, 290 (2011).  And in earlier years the CAVC had to admonish the VA for attempting to unilaterally 
suspend CAVC decisions while the VA pursued an appeal to the Federal Circuit.  See Ribaudo v. 
Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 552 (2007) (en banc); Ramsey v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 16 (2006).  I have 
discussed the importance of Ribaudo and Ramsey in prior writings.  See Allen, Legislative Commission, 
supra note 17, at 381–83; Allen, Significant Developments: 2004–2006, supra note 17, at 512–14. 
 224. The Supreme Court has recognized this reality.  See, e.g., Walters v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Radiation 
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323–24 (1985) (―A necessary concomitant of Congress‘ desire that a veteran 
not need a representative to assist him in making his claim was that the system should be as informal 
and nonadversarial as possible. . . .  The regular introduction of lawyers into the proceedings would be 
quite unlikely to further this goal.‖). 
 225. Gambill v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1307, 1327–28 (2009) (Moore, J., concurring); but see id. at 
1313–16 (Bryson, J., concurring) (implicitly rejecting that the increased presence of lawyers in the 
system had altered its fundamental nature). 
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which we as a nation ensure that the men and women who have served 
honorably in the military receive what they have been promised is 
important.  Commitments have been made to these veterans.  Procedures 
must be in place to ensure that they receive prompt, accurate, 
transparent, and fair resolution of their claims. 
Second, the system currently in place to achieve the goal of living up 
to these commitments has flaws.  One can debate how serious those 
flaws might be, but it is beyond serious dispute that deficiencies exist. 
Cushman provides the opportunity—perhaps even the necessity—to 
address the way in which the veterans‘ benefits system is constructed at 
a fundamental level.  I have advocated for such a comprehensive review 
of the system even before Cushman.226  Other serious scholars have 
done so as well.227  We should not lose the opportunity Cushman 
provides to step back and consider how the system should operate.  The 
answers to the serious questions at play are not easy, but the need to 
engage in this conversation is clear. 
This conclusion is not the place in which to engage in the 
conversation Cushman requires.  I have generally avoided taking 
positions about what the system should be because of the need to ensure 
that all relevant constituencies have a voice.228  For now, then, I will 
conclude with the provocative thought that perhaps at the end of the day 
we need to face the reality that, no matter how well-meaning, 
paternalism to our veterans has served its purpose and may now be 
doing more harm than good.229  If that is the case, we need to reorient 
the current system in a way at recognizes its more adversarial nature and 
builds processes that are based more on current realities and less on 
ideals that may no longer exist.  At a minimum, we owe it to the women 
and men who have served this country to consciously consider this issue 
no matter how one ultimately resolves it. 
 
 226. See Allen, Legislative Commission, supra note 17. 
 227. See, e.g., Ridgway, Twenty Years, supra note 65; Riley, Simplify, supra note 171; Riley, Pro-
Claimant, supra note 49. 
 228. See, e.g., Allen, Legislative Commission, supra note 17, at 393. 
 229. Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(―Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government‘s 
purposes are beneficent.  Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by 
evil-minded rulers.  The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding.‖).  Justice Stevens quoted this passage from Justice Brandeis over 
twenty-five years ago in his dissent in Walters.  Walters, 473 U.S. at 367 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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